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December 2, 1991
Mary T. Noonan
Clerk of the Court
Utah Court of Appeals
400 Midtown Plaza
230 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Re:

State v. Galleaos, Case No. 890513-CA

Dear Ms. Noonan:
I wish to make the following correction to the State's brief in
the above-referenced case, filed with the Court on October 30,
1991.
The brief inadvertently cites the 1990 version of Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-23a-8(l) in support of the State's argument that the statute
is in accord with its federal counterpart (Appellee's Brief at 13
n.5).
The State's argument on this point is based on the 1988
version of the statute, effective at the time of relevant events in
this case. Therefore, footnote 5 on page 13 of the State's brief,
only to the extent that it quotes the 1990 version of the statute,
should be amended to reflect a reference to the 1988 version of the
statute, as follows:
5

Defendant has not cited to any specific section of the
act; therefore, the State assumes for purposes of analysis
that defendant's challenge is based on language contained in
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23a-8(l) (1988), which provides, in
pertinent part, as follows:
The attorney general of the state, or any
assistant
attorney
general
specially
designated by the attorney general or any
county attorney or deputy county attorney
specially designated by the county attorney,
may authorize an application to a judge of
competent jurisdiction for, and the judge may

grant in conformity with the procedures for
interception of wire . . . communications by
any law enforcement agency of this state or
any political subdivisions responsible for the
investigation of the type of offense regarding
which the application is made, an order
authorizing of approving the interception of a
wire
. . . communication by any law
enforcement agency of this state or any
political subdision responsible for the
investigation of the offense for which the
application is made, when the interception
sought may provide or has provided evidence of
the commission of the offense of • . . dealing
in narcotic drugs, marihuana, or other
dangerous drugs . . ., and punishable by
imprisonment for more than one year, or any
conspiracy to commit any of these offenses.
Thank you for your attention to this matter.
Respectfully,

'
cc:

Randall Gaither

Kenneth A. Bronston
Assitant Attorney General
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

I

Plaintiff-Appellee,

: Case No,

890513-CA

v*

:

ROSS GALLEGOS,

: Category No. 2

Defendant-Appellant.

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction for two counts of
agreeing, consenting, offering or arranging to distribute
cocaine, second degree felonies, and eight counts of agreeing,
consenting, offering or arranging to distribute marijuana, third
degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
S 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (1990), in the Fourth Judicial District Court
in and for Utah County, State of Utah, the Honorable Ray M.
Harding, presiding.

This Court has jurisdiction to hear this

appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1991).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issues presented in this appeal are:
1.

Did defendant fail to preserve (1) his allegation

of error regarding the standard of review applicable to district
court orders authorizing wiretaps by failing to timely present
his argument to the trial court, (2) his claim that the Utah

Controlled Substances Act is unconstitutional and (3) his
objection to the trial court's jury instructions?

As a general

rule, the grounds for an objection must be distinctly and
specifically stated in the trial court before this Court will
review those grounds on appeal.

State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141,

1144-45 (Utah 1989); State v. Carter. 707 P.2d 656, 661 (Utah
1985).
2.

Did defendant fail to provide an adequate record

for review by this Court?

It is a well established rule of

appellate procedure that the party asserting error has the "duty
and responsibility of supporting such allegation by an adequate
record."

State v. Wulffenstein, 657 P.2d 289, 294 (Utah 1982),

cert, denied, 460 U.S. 1044 (1983).

Where the defendant fails to

supplement the record with evidence critical to his allegations
of error on appeal, the appellate court will presume the
regularity of the proceedings below.

State v. Robbins, 709 P.2d

771, 773 (Utah 1985).
3.

Was the evidence presented at trial sufficient to

support the jury's verdict?

When challenging the jury's verdict,

the defendant must show that the evidence and its inferences are
so "inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds
must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant
committed the crime of which he was convicted. •• State v. Petree,
659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983).

"[S]o long as some evidence and

reasonable inferences support the jury's findings, [the appellate
court] will not disturb them.

See State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342,
2

345 (Utah 1985) ."
1990).

State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 738 (Utah App,

To meet this burden, defendant must marshal all the

evidence in support of the verdict and then demonstrate that even
viewing it in the light most favorable to the court below, the
evidence is insufficient to support the verdict. Failure to so
marshal the evidence waives an appellant's right to have his
claim of insufficiency considered on appeal. JId. at 738-39.
4.

Did the trial court properly deny defendant's

motion for a mistrial made on the ground that defendant was
prejudiced by witness statements alluding to his prior criminal
activities?

A motion for mistrial is addressed the sound

discretion of the trial court, and its ruling will not be upset
unless it appears that it has abused its discretion.
Thompson, 751 P.2d 805, 818 (Utah App. 1988).

State v.

"With regard to

motions for mistrial . . . '[t]he critical inquiry should be
whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the incident so
prejudiced the jury that in its absence there might have been a
different result."

Ibid.

"[The appellate court] will not

reverse a conviction unless the error is substantial and
prejudicial in the sense that there is a reasonable likelihood
that in its absence there would have been a more favorable result
for the defendant."

State v. Johnson. 771 P.2d 1071, 1073 (Utah

1989) (footnote omitted).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Determinative constitutional provisions, statutes and
rules are compiled in Appendix A where not set forth in the body
3

of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Ross Gallegos, was charged by information
with one count of conducting or participating in the conduct of
an enterprise through a pattern of unlawful activity, a second
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-10-1603, and
-1603.5 (1990) (count 1). He was also charged with three counts
of agreeing, consenting, offering or arranging to distribute
cocaine, second degree felonies (counts 10, 13 and 18), and
sixteen counts of agreeing, consenting, offering or arranging to
distribute marijuana, third degree felonies (counts 2-9, 11, 12,
14-17 and 20), in violation of the Utah Controlled Substances
Act, Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (1990) (Record,
hereinafter "R." 27-31).
Prior to a jury trial,

defendant moved to dismiss

count 1, the pattern of racketeering charge, and to suppress
telephonic recordings obtained by wire interception (hereinafter
"wiretaps") on the following grounds relevant to this appeal:
(1) Utah's Interception of Communications Act, Utah Code Ann. SS
77-23a-l to -16 (1990), violated federal law and was
unconstitutional under both the United States and Utah
Constitutions, (2) the wiretap order was invalid and illegal, and
(3) the police agency conducting the wiretap did not adequately
minimize the interception of telephone calls (R. 35-37, 115-16).
Defendant's motion to suppress was heard on July 12, 1989, at
which time the trial court took evidence, but did not rule,
4

continuing the matter until July 25, 1989 (R. 90-91).

At that

hearing, defendant and the State made their arguments on the
motion to suppress, and the trial court again took the motions to
suppress and to dismiss under advisement (Transcript of July 25,
1989, hereinafter "Tl.").
Immediately preceding the commencement of trial, the
court denied the motion to suppress and dismissed count 9
(Transcript of July 26, 1989, hereinafter "T2." 4-5). During
trial, the court also dismissed count 10 (Transcript of July 27,
1989, hereinafter "T3." 99). At the close of the State's case,
defendant renewed his motion to dismiss count one and, further,
to dismiss counts two through twenty, apparently on the grounds
that there was no actual transfer of drugs and that defendant's
wiretapped conversations evidenced no more than mere
accommodation to provide controlled substances (T3. 99-111).
Defendant also moved for a mistrial based on witness's references
which inferred that defendant (1) had been in jail before and (2)
had been previously "busted" (T3. 99). The trial court later
denied these motions (T3. 194).
Defendant was convicted of two counts of agreeing,
consenting, offering or arranging to distribute cocaine (counts
13 and 18), and eight counts of agreeing, consenting, offering or
arranging to distribute marijuana (counts 3, 7, 8, 11, 12, 14, 15
and 19) (R. 250, 307-24).

Thereafter, defendant filed motions to

arrest judgment and for a new trial (R. 349-50, 354-55).

The

motions were denied and defendant was sentenced to one to fifteen

5

years on counts 13 and 18 and to not less that five years on all
remaining counts (R. 359-60)•

Defendant was granted a

certificate of probable cause and was ordered released and
transported to the Alcohol Recovery Center upon posting of
$ 10,000-00 bail (R. 363, 372),
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
A recitation of the facts here involved is not
necessary to a resolution of the issues raised on appeal.
Rather, critical facts will be discussed in the body of this
brief as they become relevant to specific issues.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The majority of the issues that defendant raises on
appeal are properly dismissed on procedural grounds of either
waiver and/or lack of record support.

It is well established

that the grounds for an objection to evidence must be distinctly
and specifically stated in the trial court before an appellate
court will review those grounds on appeal.

Because defendant

failed to timely present (1) his allegation of error regarding
the standard of review applicable to district court orders
authorizing the wiretaps, (2) his claim that the Utah Controlled
Substances Act is unconstitutional and (3) his objection to the
trial court's jury instructions, he has waived consideration of
these issues by this Court.1
1

In anticipation of defendant's moving this Court for leave
to augment the record and permit him to file a supplemental
brief, the State has filed, contemporaneously with this
responsive brief, a motion for leave to file a supplemental brief
when the record has been fully augmented.
6

Notwithstanding this Court's possible decision to
review issues defendant failed to preserve for appeal,
defendant's claims as to (1) the unconstitutionality of the Utah
Controlled Substances Act and (2) the trial court's erroneous
rulings as to jury instructions are unmeritorious.

First, Utah's

current Controlled Substances Act is not unconstitutional.
Although the Utah Supreme Court has previously upheld the act as
constitutional, defendant asserts that the current act is
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad because the "for value"
element of the offense has since been deleted by legislative
amendment.

However, the current act, like its predecessor,

clearly specifies that it is unlawful for any person to knowingly
and intentionally engage in conduct which either leads to, or
results in the distribution of controlled substances.

Thus, the

average citizen is put on notice that any act in furtherance of
the distribution of a controlled substance, or arrangement
therefore, constitutes the criminal offense described by the
statute.

As to defendant's allegations of "overbreadth," he has

wholly failed to demonstrate that the act prohibits
constitutionally protected conduct.

Second, the trial court's

jury instruction setting out the elements necessary to prove
defendant guilty under the "arranging" portion of the statute
were expressed in the statutory language almost verbatim and were
clear.
Defendant's failure to adequately supplement the record
in this case similarly precludes review by this Court of his

7

assertions of error concerning the district court's order
authorizing the wiretap.

Specifically, defendant has not

included in the record on appeal the application for an ex parte
wiretap order, the supporting affidavits, the ex parte order or
the weekly reports actually stating the manner in which the
wiretap was carried out; therefore, this Court may properly
assume the regularity of the district court's order and decline
review of all defendant's allegations related thereto.
Contrary to defendant's claim, the Interception of
Communications Act does not conflict with its federal
counterpart.

The federal act expressly authorizes the principal

prosecuting attorney of any political subdivision of the state to
apply for a wiretap order, if state law so provides.

In

accordance with that directive, the Utah wiretap act, read in
conjunction with the Utah Constitution, clearly identifies a
county attorney as a prosecutor authorized to apply for a wiretap
order.
As to defendant's allegations of insufficient evidence,
he has neither marshaled all the evidence in support of the
jury's verdict nor demonstrated that the evidence, including all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient to support
the jury's verdict with respect to all but four of the counts on
which he was convicted; thus, at to those counts untreated in
defendant's brief, this Court need not and should not consider
his allegations. As to those counts for which evidence is
arguably marshalled, the evidence was clearly sufficient to
8

support the jury's verdict of guilt under the arranging statute.
Finally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in denying defendant's motion for mistrial made on the ground
that defendant was prejudiced by two statements made by witnesses
alluding to his prior criminal activities.

The first statement

had negligible prejudicial value, evidenced by the jury's ability
to distinguish between defendant's guilt on some counts and his
innocence on others. Any prejudice associated with the second
statement was cured by the trial court's immediately striking it
from the record and instructing the jury to disregard it.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT FAILED TO PRESERVE THE ISSUE RAISED
IN POINT I OF HIS BRIEF FOR REVIEW BY THIS
COURT AND HAS FAILED TO COMPILE AN ADEQUATE
RECORD FOR REVIEW.
In Point I of his brief defendant argues that a strict
standard should be applied "to all issues involving all orders
authorizing interception of communications on the trial or
appellate level;" therefore, this Court should adopt a "strict
standard" in reviewing the trial court's denial of his motion to
suppress.

Specifically, defendant argues that this Court should

apply a "standard of strict compliance with all aspects of" [the
Interception of Communications Act]"2 (Appellant's Brief at 12).
Defendant thereafter continues to assert the trial court's
failure to apply the appropriate standard, identifying a number

2

See Utah Code Ann. S 77-23a-2 (1990).
9

of deficiencies in the application and affidavit supporting the
order (Appellant's Brief at 14-15).
In order to assess whether or not the trial court
deviated from the standards suggested by defendant, assuming such
standards are applicable to this case, the record on appeal must
at least contain the order, and the application and affidavit in
support.

Further, weekly reports, describing the manner in which

the wiretap was actually carried out, were supplied to the trial
court (Tl. 57-58).

In this case defendant has not included in

the record on appeal any of those crucial documents.3
Rule 11(e)(2), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,
provides:
If the appellant intends to urge on
appeal that a finding or conclusion is
unsupported by or is contrary to the
evidence, the appellant shall include in the
record a transcript of all evidence relevant
to such finding or conclusion.
(emphasis added)•
It is a well established rule of appellate procedure
that where, as in the present case, a defendant asserts error, he
has the "duty and responsibility of supporting such allegation by
an adequate record."

State v. Wulffenstein, 657 P.2d 289, 293

3

Defendant has appended to his brief uncertified copies of
the application for the ex parte wiretap order and the order.
Inclusion of uncertified copies of documents necessary to the
determination of an issue is insufficient to create a record that
can be considered on appeal. State v. Lairbv, 699 P.2d 1187,
1192 (Utah 1984).

10

(Utah 1982)f cert, denied, 460 U.S. 1044 (1983). Without record
support, defendant's assertions of error in the district court's
order "stands as a unilateral allegation" which this Court has no
power to determine,

id.; State v. Robbins, 709 P.2d 771, 773

(Utah 1985); Intermountain Power Agency v. Bowers-Irons
Recreation Land & Cattle Co., 786 P.2d 250# 252 (Utah App. 1990)
(Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure direct counsel to provide the
reviewing court with all evidence relevant to the issues raised
on appeal).

Where, as here, defendant has failed to supplement

the record with evidence critical to a determination of his
allegations on appeal, this Court must presume the regularity of
the trial court's order.

Ibid.: Jolivet v. Cook, 784 P.2d 1148,

1150 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 110 S.Ct. 751 (1990) (the
appellate court assumes regularity in the proceedings below if
appellant fails to provide an adequate record on appeal); State
v. Marcum, 750 P.2d 599, 603 (Utah 1988) (absent evidence of
error, the regularity of the proceeding below should be assumed);
State v. Theison, 709 P.2d 307, 309 (Utah 1985) (where crucial
matters were not included in the record, court may presume the
missing portions support the action of the trial court).
Additionally, defendant failed to properly preserve
this issue for appeal.

Rule 12, Utah Rules of Criminal

Procedure, provides:
(b) Any defense, objection or request,
including requests for ruling on the
admissibility of evidence, which is capable
of determination without the trial of the
general issue may be raised prior to trial by
written motion. The following shall be
11

raised at least five day prior to the trial:
.

• • •

(2) motions concerning the admissibility of
evidence.
(emphasis added).

Rule 12(d) further provides that failure to

raise objections or defenses "shall constitute a waiver thereof,
but the court for cause shown may grant relief from such waiver."
Utah R. Crim. P. 12(d).

See also State v. Belcrard, 160 Utah Adv.

Rep. 42, 44-45 (Utah App. 1991).
Defendant moved to suppress evidence obtained pursuant
to a wiretap of all his incoming and outgoing telephone calls on
the grounds that (1) Utah's Interception of Communications Act,
Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-23a-l to -16 (1990), violated federal law
and was unconstitutional under both the United States and Utah
constitutions, (2) the wiretap order was invalid and illegal, and
(3) the police agency conducting the wiretap did not adequately
minimize interception of telephone calls (R. 35-37).

There is no

argument concerning a requirement to apply a strict standard in
that motion.

The hearing on defendant's motion was held on July

12, 1989 (R. 90-91).
the record.

There is no transcript of that hearing in

The July 12th hearing was continued until July 25,

1989, the day immediately preceding trial (R. 91). The record
contains an unsigned memorandum in support of defendant's motion
to suppress, filed July 20, 1989 (R. 175-183).

It is only in

that memorandum that defendant makes his first reference to a
"strict standard" (R. 175). Thus, in first referencing the
application of a strict standard less than five working days
12

before trial, defendant was untimely in bringing such argument
before the trial court and failed to preserve the claim on
appeal.

Utah R. Crim. P. 12(b)(1), (d); see also State v.

Fulton, 742 P.2d 1208, 1212 (Utah 1987) (defendant precluded from
introducing allegedly exculpatory polygraph for failure to timely
raise question of admissibility prior to trial).
POINT II
FOR THE PURPOSES OF THIS CASE SECTION 77-23a8(1) OF THE INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS
ACT IS IN ACCORD WITH ITS FEDERAL
COUNTERPART, 18 U.S.C. S 2516(2), IN
AUTHORIZING THE COUNTY ATTORNEY TO MAKE
APPLICATION FOR A WIRETAP.
In Point II, defendant alleges that Utah's Interception
of Communications Act violates its federal counterpart4 by
failing to limit applications for authorization for wiretaps
solely to the Utah Attorney General5 (Appellant's brief at 15* Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 2510-2510 (Supp. 1991), "provides the
framework for the Utah Interception of Communications Act," Utah
Code Ann. §§ 77-23a-l to 77-23a-16 (1990). "The Utah Act, as
well as its federal counterpart, set forth the procedure for
authorizing and approving the interception of wire
communications." State v. Hunt, 781 P.2d 473, 475 (Utah App.
1989). Although States may enact legislation "more restrictive
than the baseline protections" allowed by the federal act, "'any
State law drawn more broadly . . . . runs afoul of the supremacy
clause (U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2).' M People v. Vespucci, 554
N.Y.S.2d 417, 75 N.Y.2d 434, 553 N.E.2d 965, 967 (N.Y. 1990)
(citations omitted).
5

Defendant has not cited to any specific section of the
act; therefore, the State assumes for purposes of analysis that
defendant's challenge is based on language contained in Utah Code
Ann. § 77-23a-8(l) (1990) which provides as follows:
The attorney general of the state or any
assistant attorney general, or any county
attorney or deputy county attorney may

13

20).

Specifically, defendant asserts that •the [ajttorney

[g]eneral as a member of the [e]xecutive [ddepartment is the
principal prosecuting attorney of the state and should be the
only official capable of authorizing and applying for a wiretap .
. . •" (Appellant's Brief at 17).
Defendant's analysis of the issue conflicts with the plain
language of the both the federal and state statutes.
statute clearly authorizes not only

The federal

"[t]he principal prosecuting

attorney" of the state, but also "the principal prosecuting
attorney of any political subdivision" in the state to make
application for an order authorizing a wiretap, so long as there
authorize an application to a judge of
competent jurisdiction for an order for an
interception of wire, electronic, or oral
communications by any law enforcement agency
of the state or of any political subdivision
that is responsible for investigating the
type of offense for which the application is
made.
The federal Wire and Oral Interception Act provides, in
pertinent part:
The principal prosecuting attorney of
any State, or the principal prosecuting
attorney of any political subdivision
thereof, if such attorney is authorized by a
statute of that State to make application to
a State court judge of competent jurisdiction
for an order authorizing or approving the
interception of wire, oral, or electronic
communications, may apply to such judge for,
and such judge may grant in conformity with
section 2518 of this chapter and with the
applicable State statute, an order
authorizing, or approving the interception of
wire, oral, or electronic communications . .
18 U.S.C. § 2516(2) (Supp. 1991).
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is also a state statue authorizing the same.

See U.S.C. S

2516(2) • The state statute similarly authorizes the attorney
general of the state, or any county attorney, to authorize an
application for a wiretap order.

See section 77-23a-8(l).

Because neither the federal nor Utah statutes limit authorization
solely to the "principal prosecuting attorney" of the state,
defendant's argument is without merit.

Vespucci, 553 N.E.2d at

967-968 (noting that Congress wrote a generic enabling statute to
cover the 50 widely varying official titles and chains of command
in all the state jurisdictions).
POINT III
DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO PROPERLY SUPPORT HIS
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR ON APPEAL WITH CITES TO
AN EXISTING RECORD HAMPERS THE STATE'S
RESPONSE AND PRECLUDES MEANINGFUL REVIEW BY
THIS COURT.
In Points III and V of his brief on appeal, defendant
attacks the validity of the court order authorizing the wiretap
of his phone on the grounds that the order (1) failed to set
forth adequate guidelines for purposes of minimization6 and (2)
failed to properly limit the persons authorized to intercept

6

Utah Code Ann. S 77-23a-10(5)(c) (1990) provides:
Every order and extension shall contain a
provision that the authorization to intercept
shall be executed as soon as practicable,
shall be conducted so as to minimize the
interception of communications not otherwise
subject to interception under this chapter,
and must terminate upon attainment of the
authorized objective, or in any event within
30 days.

15

communications7 (Appellant's Brief at 20-21, 23-24).

In Point

IV, defendant asserts that the officers conducting the wiretap
failed to adequately limit the communications intercepted in
accordance with the court order (Appellant's Brief at 21-23).
Although defendant quotes portions of the court order, a copy of
the order has not been included in the record on appeal.
Further, defendant has failed to include the affidavit supporting
the application for the ex parte wiretap order or the weekly
records describing how the order was actually carried out.
Moreover, a review of the record as it is presently constituted
is devoid of any indication that defendant has moved to
supplement the record with copies of those crucial documents
(Defendant's Request for Transcript, R. 370).
Since defendant has failed to support his argument with
an adequate record, demonstrating the contents of the order, the
basis on which the order was issued, and the manner in which the
order was actually carried out, his argument is without merit and
cannot be meaningfully reviewed by this Court.

State v.

Wulffenstein, 657 P.2d 289, 293 (Utah 1982), cert, denied, 460
U.S. 1044 (1983) (noting that where a defendant asserts error, he
has the duty and responsibility of supporting his assertion by an
7

Defendant argues that the wiretap order is overbroad and
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 77-23a-2(5) and 77-23a-3(d)
(Appellant's Brief at 23). These sections are non-existent.
Therefore, this Court may refuse to consider this component of
defendant's argument because it is effectively unsupported by
legal authority. State v. Amicone, 589 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah
1984). In fact, Utah Code Ann. § 77-23a-10(3)(d) (1990) provides
that the order authorizing the wiretap shall identify the agency
authorized to conduct the wiretap.
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adequate record).

Where, as here, defendant has failed to

supplement the record with evidence critical to a determination
of his allegations on appeal, this Court must presume the
regularity of the application.

Jolivet v. Cook, 784 P.2d 1148,

1150 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 110 S.Ct. 751 (1990) (the
appellate court assumes regularity in the proceedings below if
appellant fails to provide an adequate record on appeal); State
v. Marcum, 750 P.2d 599, 603 (Utah 1988) (absent evidence of
error, the regularity of the proceeding below should be assumed);
State v. Theison, 709 P.2d 307, 309 (Utah 1985) (where crucial
matters were not included in the record, the appellate court may
presume the missing portions support the action of the trial
court).
POINT IV
DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE
IN SUPPORT OF HIS CLAIM OF INSUFFICIENT
EVIDENCE PRECLUDES CONSIDERATION OF THE ISSUE
BY THIS COURT; ALTERNATIVELY, WHERE DEFENDANT
HAS ARGUABLY MARSHALED THE EVIDENCE, HE HAS
NOT DEMONSTRATED THAT THE EVIDENCE, INCLUDING
ALL REASONABLE INFERENCES DRAWN THEREFROM, IS
INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE JURY'S VERDICT.
In Point VI of his brief, defendant alleges that the
evidence was insufficient to convict him of the offenses charged
and appears to attack the lack of additional evidence, broadly
asserting that the State "never proved all of the elements of the
offense[s]M (Appellant's Brief at 26).

In Point VIII of his

brief, defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to
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support his convictions on counts 13 and 18.8 However,
defendant asserts this claim with minimal specificity and only as
to counts 3 and 19 (Point VI) and 13 and 18 (Point VIII)
(Appellant's Brief at 26-28 and 33-34).
In order to successfully challenge the jury's verdict
the reviewing court must find that the evidence and its
inferences are so "inconclusive or inherently improbable that
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that
the defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted."
State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983).

In undertaking

such review, the appellate court will "view the evidence, along
with the reasonable inferences from it, in the light most
favorable to the verdict."

State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 738

(Utah App. 1990) (citation omitted).

M

[S]o long as some evidence

and reasonable inferences support the jury's findings, we will
not disturb them.
1985)."

See State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah

Ibid.
To meet this burden, defendant must marshal all the

evidence in support of the verdict and then demonstrate that even
viewing it in the light most favorable to the court below, the
evidence is insufficient to support the vcsrdict. Failure to so
marshal the evidence waives an appellant's right to have his
claim of insufficiency considered on appeal. Moore, 802 P.2d at
8

Defendant couches this argument in terms of the evidence
establishing only accommodation and non-distribution of
controlled substances (Appellant's Brief at 32). Essentially,
this too is an insufficiency of evidence argument.
18

738-39.

Because defendant has failed to marshal the evidence in

support of the jury's verdict of guilt on counts other than 3/
13, 18 and 19 on which he was convicted (e.g., counts 7, 8, 11,
12, 14 and 15), this Court need not and should not consider
defendant's allegations of insufficiency in Point VI.
Notwithstanding the above, in Points VI and VIII of his
brief defendant specifically attacks the sufficiency of the
evidence in support of counts 3, 13, 18 and 19, and arguably
attempts to marshal all the evidence the jury relied upon in
finding defendant guilty of those charges.

However, in making

his argument defendant appears to lose sight of the clear
elements required to establish criminal culpability.

Utah Code

Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (1990) makes it unlawful to knowingly
and intentionally to "agree, consent, offer, or arrange to
distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance."
The State introduced call #143 as its primary evidence
of defendant's guilt on count 3 (T2. 176).9
9

Defendant was

The numbered transcriptions of intercepted communications
comprise the State's exhibit #1 (R. 254). None of these
transcriptions were expressly correlated with the particular
counts with which defendant was charged in the course of trial,
except during the State's closing, and then only with respect to
some of the charges. Therefore, in order to demonstrate which
wiretapped calls were offered as support for a particular charge
certain identifying features of the call, as evidenced by the
relevant wiretap transcript, must be correlated with either the
party's reference in closing argument and/or the charge as set
forth in the information. With respect to count 3, the State
stated that the charge was supported by the evidence of call
#143, and defendant referenced the phrase, "check it out," which
appears in the transcript of call #143 (T3. 126, 156-57).
Further, count 3 concerns a criminal act occurring on March 24,
1989, to which a Mike Ovard was a party (R. 27-28; Transcript of
call #143, Appendix B). No other transcriptions made on March 24
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identified as a party to that conversation by a police officer
who had become familiar with those voices that were regularly
heard over the wiretapped telephone (T2. 177). In the course of
that conversation defendant indicated that he had been unable to
obtain "smoke" for the caller and agreed to check around for "an
elbow."

Expert testimony had earlier identified "smoke" as

marijuana and "elbow" as a half-pound of marijuana (T2. 67-68,
136, 138).10
Calls #621 and #639 were introduced to prove the
charges in count 13 (T3. 28, 55). u Dan LeMaster testified for
the State as to the conversation set out in call #621 (T3. 2952).

In that call LeMaster stated to defendant that he had

unsuccessfully sought to obtain some "white" from "the Villa[i]n"
and then told defendant that he needed "a little half."

The

conversation then continued as follows:
LeMaster: Urn, well I was just gonna cruise
over and pick it up if I could find
Villa[i]n, if I could find him just
cruise over pick 'em up.
Defendant:

Yeah, if you could find Villa[i]n

and offered in evidence include conversations with a Mike Ovard.
10

Mark West, Provo City pclice officer, testified that
cocaine could also be smoked (T2. 83); however, Chris Orndorff,
testified that he had never heard of "smoke" used with reference
to any other controlled substance than marijuana (T2. 93).
11

Both the State and defendant indicated in closing arguments
that the witness, Dan LeMaster, made a reference to "the villain"
in the relevant transcription used as evidence to support count 13
(T3. 131, 160). That reference appears only in call #621 (Appendix
B). Call #639, based on its date and time and the parties to the
conversation, is clearly a followup to call #621 (Appendix B).
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you wouldn't even need me,
LeMaster:
Defendant:

Yeah, right.

But ya know.

Huh.

LeMaster: Do you know where somethin, ya
know somethin's happen.
Defendant:
but.

I know where somethin's happen

LeMaster: I could just meet ya someplace in
a half hour or somethin.
Defendant: I know but I was supposed to go
to lunch right now.
LeMaster:
Defendant:
LeMaster:
Defendant:

Oh, really?
Uh-huh ( + ) 12
After lunch?
Yeah.

(Transcript of call #621 at 4).

The terms "white" and "a little

half" had earlier been identified by LeMaster as drug jargon
referring to (1) cocaine and (2) a half a gram of cocaine or
marijuana, respectively (T2. 134-35).13
Count 18 was supported by the evidence of call

12

The significance of this symbol is nowhere explained in
the record, including the monitoring instructions, State's
exhibit 10 to the July 12, 1989 hearing (R. 92).
13

Call #639 indicates that LeMaster unsuccessfully
attempted to meet defendant and that defendant told LeMaster that
he would probably not be able to get "it" because "they" were now
watching him next door to his shop (Transcript of call #639 at 12).
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#1339 •

Both LeMaster and Provo City police officer Tom

Nielson, who monitored and transcribed the call, testified that
LeMaster and defendant were the parties to that conversation (T3.
73-75)•

In that conversation defendant offered to provide

LeMaster with a "gamer" (Transcript of call #1339 at 3, Appendix
B).

LeMaster earlier testified that "gamer" referred to an

eighth of an ounce of cocaine (T2. 136).
Lastly, count 19 was supported by call #1502.15
Sergio Gonzales testified that he and defendant were the parties
to that call, in which defendant offered, at Gonzales' request,
to supply Gonzales with a "green paper," and thereafter directed
Gonzales to his address (T3. 81-82; Transcript of call #1502,
Appendix B).
81).

Gonzales identified "green paper" as "pot" (T3.

Officer Orndorff had earlier testified that "pot" referred

to mari juana (T2. 96).
The State concedes that in none of these instances did
defendant transfer controlled substances to any of the potential
buyers.

However, under section 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) of the Utah

Controlled Substances Act actual transfer for value is not an
element of the crime.

State v. Pelton, 801 P.2d 184, 186 (Utah

App. 1990) (post-amendment arranging statute, in which the "for

14

Both the State and defendant spoke, in closing, to count
18 in terms of the conversation having LeMaster as a party and in
which reference is made to a "gamer," a term used in call #1339
(T3. 137, 163).
15

Both the State and defendant spoke to count 19 with
reference to defendant's conversation with a Sergio Gonzales,
whose name appears only in call #1502 (T3. 137-38, 163).
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value" element had been deleted from the predecessor statute, was
not unconstitutionally vague): State v. Clark, 783 P.2d 68, 69
(Utah App. 1989) (culpability under the arranging statute does
not require

the actual consummation of a sale of controlled

substances); State v. Harrison, 601 P.2d 922, 923 n.5 (Utah 1979)
(M[t]he offense of arranging the distribution for value of a
controlled substance does not require the actual distribution. •')
Therefore, the facts set forth above with respect to each of the
counts discussed amply demonstrate that the jury had sufficient
evidence on which to convict defendant.
POINT V
DEFENDANT FAILED TO PRESERVE FOR REVIEW THE
ISSUE RAISED IN POINT VII OF HIS BRIEF; IN
ANY EVENT, UTAH'S CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT
IS CONSTITUTIONAL.
In Point VII of his brief defendant asserts that the
offense of distribution of or arranging to distribute a
controlled substance as prohibited in the Utah Controlled
Substances Act16 is "unconstitutionally vague and over-broad
because it does not clearly define the conduct prohibited when
the element of a sale for value is absentM (Appellant's Brief at
31).
16

Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (1990) provides in
pertinent part:
Except as authorized by this chapter, it is
unlawful for any person to knowingly and
intentionally: . . • (ii) distribute a
controlled or counterfeit substance, or to
agree, consent, offer, or arrange to
distribute a controlled or counterfeit
substance . • •
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In State in Interest of M.S.. 781 P.2d 1289 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989), the Court stated:
It is a fundamental principle of appellate
review that matters not raised at the trial
level cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal• . • •
Moreover, this principle applies equally to
constitutional challenges not presented
below, but raised subsequently on appeal.
Id. at 1291 (Court declines to review where juvenile court judge
not given opportunity to rule on issues of constitutionality);
see also State v. Carter. 707 P.2d 656, 660-61 (Utah 1985)
(failure to raise particular ground for suppressing evidence
precludes consideration of appeal on that ground).
Nowhere in any pre-trial motions to suppress or to
dismiss# or in any trial, or post-trial motions to arrest
judgment or for a new trial, does defendemt raise the issue of
the unconstitutionality of the arranging statute.

Since

defendant failed to timely and specifically preserve this issue
below, this Court should now decline to review it on appeal.
State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1144-45 (Utah 1989) (noting
general rule that the grounds for the objection must be
distinctly and specifically stated in the trial court before an
appellate court will review those grounds on appeal).
In any event, section 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) is clearly
constitutional.17

In State v. Harrison, 601 P.2d 922 (Utah

17

Defendant's brief fails to distinguish between
"vagueness" and "overbreadth" and, in fact, only argues the
former. Therefore, the State will limit its response to the
question of vagueness.
• • . cont. on next page . . •
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1979), the Utah Supreme Court examined the predecessor statute18
under a similar challenge and found it to be constitutional.

In

so finding, the Harrison court observed that,
[b]readth of coverage, in and of itself, does
not render a statute unconstitutionally
vague. A statute may legitimately proscribe
a broad spectrum of conduct with very few
words, so long as the outer perimeters of
such conduct are clearly defined.
Id. at 923.

The predecessor act accomplished this by clearly

specifying that "any activity leading to or resulting in the
distribution for value of a controlled substance" must be engaged
in knowingly or intentionally.

Ibid.

Thus, because "any witting

or intentional lending of aid in the distribution of drugs,

Concerning overbreadth, defendant correctly asserts
that the arranging statute makes it a felony to "share an amount
of marijuana." However, he has not and cannot show that "sharing
marijuana" is a constitutionally protected right. To be
overbroad, a statute must reach a "substantial amount of
constitutionally protected conduct[;] [i]f it does not, then the
overbreadth challenge must fail." State v. Murphy, 674 P.2d
1220, 1222 (Utah 1983) (quoting Village of Hoffman Estates v.
Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494 (1982)).
Where, as here, defendant has not shown and cannot show that the
statute reaches a "substantial amount of constitutionally
protected conduct," his allegation of "overbreadth" is simply
without merit. Hoffman, 733 P.2d at 505 (noting that an
"overbreadth" analysis relates to whether the statute is so broad
that it may prohibit constitutionally protected behavior).
18

See Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) (1979) which read
in pertinent part:
Except as authorized by this act, it shall be
unlawful for any person knowingly and
intentionally: . . . (4) to agree, consent,
offer, or arrange to distribute or dispense a
controlled substance for value or to
negotiate to have a controlled substance
distributed or dispensed for value . . . .
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whatever form it takes, is proscribed by the act[,] [t]he citizen
of average intelligence is left with no confusion as to what type
of conduct is forbidden."

Id., at 923-24.

The same is true of the current act which also clearly
specifies that it is unlawful for any person to knowingly and
intentionally engage in conduct which either leads to, or results
in the distribution of controlled substances.
8(1)(a)(ii).

See § 58-37-

The current act, like its predecessor, puts the

citizen on notice "that, if he intends the distribution [] of a
controlled substance, any act in furtherance of an arrangement
therefore constitutes the criminal offense described by the
statute."

Harrison, 601 P.2d at 924.

See State v. Pelton, 801

P.2d 184, 186 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (noting that Harrison
clarifies the scope of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (Supp.
1989), thereby finding the post-amendment statute
constitutional).
POINT VI
DEFENDANT FAILED TO TIMELY AND SPECIFICALLY
OBJECT TO JURY INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN BY THE
TRIAL COURT, WHICH WERE PROPER.
This court should refuse to address the merits of
defendant's challenge to the jury instructions because he failed
to timely and specifically object.

Rule 19(c), Utah Rules of

Criminal Procedure, provides, in pertinent part:
No party may assign as error any portion of
the charge or omission therefrom unless he
objects thereto before the jury is
instructed, stating distinctly the matter to
which he objects and the grounds of his
objection. Notwithstanding a party's failure
26

to object, error may be assigned to
instructions in order to avoid manifest
injustice.
The Utah Supreme Court has held that "rule 19(c)
requires more than a general exception to the instructions.

It

requires that the matter excepted to and the ground therefore be
distinctly stated."

State v. Cantu, 750 P.2d 591, 594 (Utah

1988); see also State v. Parkin, 742 P.2d 715, 716 (Utah App.
1987) (failure to object to an instruction at trial precludes
defendant from challenging it on appeal, and failure to request
an instruction is waiver).
In the present case, the trial court held a bench
conference to allow defendant to place his objections and
exceptions in the record (T3. 176-79).

In the course of that

conference the trial court indicated that defendant, the State
and the court had earlier been involved in several lengthy
sessions regarding the appropriate instructions to be given to
the jury and that both counsel had "had ample opportunity to
present [their] positions", a statement which defendant
acknowledged as, "correct" (T3. 176-77).

Thereafter, defendant

excepted to the court's refusal to give several of his requested
instructions, and concluded by stating, "And those are the
balancef] of the objections which I have to the instructions"
(T3. 182-84).

At no time did defendant except to the trial

court's refusal to give those instructions which he urges on
appeal, nor did he object to the trial court's instructions on
the elements required to be proven on each count.
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Since

defendant failed to timely and specifically object to the trial
court's refusal of the jury instructions urged on appeal, and
further, to except to the trial court's instruction on the
elements of the arranging statute, defendant has waived his claim
of error.
Even if defendant had not waived his claim of error it
would be without sufficient merit to warrant reversal because the
trial court's instructions on the elements of the crime were
almost verbatim the language of section 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (R.
270).19

"[I]t is not error to instruct according to statutory

terms when the evidence justifies the instruction."

State v.

Ricci, 655 P.2d 690, 691-92 (Utah 1982); State v. Starks, 627
P.2d 88, 90 (Utah 1990) (instruction in form of statutory
language not improper where supported by the evidence and the
meaning of the instruction is clear).
POINT VII
INADVERTENT REFERENCES TO DEFENDANT'S PRIOR
CRIMINAL CONDUCT WERE NOT PREJUDICIAL AND
WERE CURED BY THE TRIAL COURT'S STRIKING ONE
OF THE REFERENCES AND ORDERING THE JURY TO
DISREGARD IT.
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in denying
his motion for a mistrial based upon irrelevant, unfairly
prejudicial testimony concerning defendant's prior arrests.20 A

19

The trial court's jury instruction is included at
Appendix C.
20

. Because defendant does not supply any legal analysis,
this Court may refuse to consider this issue. Amicone 689 P.2d
at 1344 (Utah 1984).
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motion for a mistrial is addressed to the sound discretion of the
trial court*
1988).

State v. Thompson, 751 P.2d 805, 818 (Utah App.

The evidence demonstrates that the trial court did not

abuse its discretion in denying the motion.
Defendant first moved for a mistrial following the
testimony of Officer Ken Parker when, in providing the foundation
for identifying defendant's voice during the wiretap, the witness
stated, "I spoke with Ross as I worked as a jailer at Provo
City." (T2. 119-20).

Oat of the jury's presence, the trial court

took the motion under advisement and granted defendant's motion
to preclude Officer Parker from further testifying (T2. 125).
Defendant again objected when LeMaster, explaining why
defendant had relinquished some control over his drug business,
stated, "Sure.
(T3. 33-34).

Ross had been busted a little while before that"

Defendant later renewed his motion for a mistrial

on the basis of this remark, which the trial court ultimately
denied (T3. 99, 194).
It is apparent that the trial court gave no curative
instructions with respect to the first statement because of its
minuscule prejudicial value, nor was any requested by defendant.
The statement was inadvertently made and did not by itself
clearly implicate defendant in other criminal action. Also,
there was no further reference to the event to which the witness
had alluded.

Indeed, the jury may well have considered that the

prosecution had been chastised by defendant's immediate request
for a bench conference, followed by the trial court's summary
29

termination of Officer's Parker's testimony.

See State v.

Humphrey, 793 P.2d 918, 925 (Utah App. 1990) (trial court has
discretion in determining if curative instruction is warranted in
a particular case).

In any event, it is clear that the jury was

not prejudiced, as evidenced by its verdict to acquit defendant
on eight of the counts with which he was charged.

See State v.

Johnson» 771 P.2d 1071, 1073 (Utah 1989) (no error affecting
defendant's substantial rights, pursuant to rule 30(a), Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure, where no showing that jury was
influenced by trial court's allusion to an additional charge);
State v. Rocco. 795 P.2d 1116, 1118 (Utah 1990) (no rule 30(a)
error where testimonial reference to defendant's knowledge of
other crimes did not necessarily implicate defendant in the
commission of those crimes).
Following defendant's objection to LeMaster's
statement, the trial court immediately sustained the objection,
ordered the statement struck from the record and instructed the
jury to disregard the statement (T3. 34-35).

It is apparent from

the jury's acquittal of defendant on eight counts that the trial
court's ruling cured any possible prejudice resulting from the
jury's hearing LeMaster's statement.

See State v. Van Dvke, 589

P.2d 764, 766-67 (Utah 1978) (defendant is not denied a fair
trial where, following codefendant's allusion to defendant's
participation in other, closely associated crimes, trial court
struck the statement and instructed the jury to disregard it);
Humphrey. 793 P.2d at 925 (no error even though trial court gave
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no curative instruction where inappropriate testimony was
stricken from the record and the jury ordered to disregard it)
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the State respectfully
requests this Court to affirm defendant's convictions,

if*
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 5 ^

day of October, 1991.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

KENNETH A. BRONSTON
Assistant Attorney General
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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

Rule 30

UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Utile 30. Errors and defects.
(a) Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect the
substantial rights of a party shall be disregarded.
(b) Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and
errors in the record arisingfromoversight or omission may be corrected by
the court at any time and after such notice, if any, as the court may order.

77-23a-10. Application for order — Authority of order —
Emergency action — Application — Entry —
Conditions — Extensions — Recordings — Admissibility or suppression — Appeal by state.
(3) Each order authorizing or approving the interception of any wire, electronic, or oral communication shall specify:
(a) the identity of the person, if known, whose communications are to
be intercepted;
(b) except as provided in Subsection (12), the nature and location of the
communications facilities as to which, or the place where, authority to
intercept is granted;
(c) a particular description of the type of communication sought to be
intercepted, and a statement of the particular offense to which it relates;
(d) the identity of the agency authorized to intercept the communications, and of the persons authorizing the application; and
(e) the period of time during which the interception is authorized, including a statement as to whether the interception shall automatically
terminate when the described communication has been first obtained.

APPENDIX B

TRANSCRIBED CONVERSATION
CALL #143
COUNTER
PG 1 OF 2 PAGES
SUBJECT NAME -TARGET PHONE -CASE NUMBER
—
DATE
NUMBER DIALED
TIME OFF HOOK
TIME ON HOOK
INCOMING
ANSWERED?
NUMBER OF RINGS
PHONE BUSY?

173 - 197
ROSS GALLEGOS
801-373-2703
8900643
03-24-89
377-4765
103702
103807
YES
NO

MINIMIZATION TIMES:
OFF
ON
OFF
ON
OFF
ON
OFF
ON
OFF
ON
OFF
ON
CALL MONITORED BY:
NIELSEN / JOHNSON
SCRIBE:
NIELSEN

#1

M MALE CHILD

#2

#3

M ROSS GALLEGOS

#4 M/F

1

Hello

2

Hi, vhere's Ross?

1

Who's this?

2

This Mike.

1

Mike who?

2

Ovard.

1

Mm K, hold on.

3

Hello.

2

Whatta ya doln Ross?

3

Hey, what's up Mike?

2

What happened to ya yesterday?

3

Where?

2

To that, smoke.

3

Oh, nothln came through.

2

Oh, really.

M MIKE OVARD

Niks Ovard (Background noise child)

That's vhat I figured.

3

Yeah

2

Yeah.

3

They...

2

Line up an elbov?

3

Ah, no

2

No?

3

Nn not nothin' right off hand.

2

Oh, really? Why don't you check it out for me and check
around or whatever.

3

OK

2

Ya know.

3

I can do that.

2

OK?

3

OK.

2

So ah just.

3

OK Bud.

2

Alrighty?

3

Alright.

2

OK

2

Bye

3

Bye

Geez, can ya

I'll probably be home ya knov.

TRANSCRIBED CONVERSATION
CALL #£21
COUNTER
PG 1 OF 5 PAGES
SUBJECT NAME -TARGET PHONE —
CASE NUMBER
—
DATE
NUMBER DIALED
TIME OFF HOOK
TIME ON HOOK
INCOMING
ANSWERED?
NUMBER OF RINGS
PHONE BUSY?

371 - 465
ROSS GALLEGOS
801-373-2703
6900643
04-03-69
377-6325
105006
103344
YES
1
NO

MINIMIZATION TIMESt
OFF
ON
OFF
ON
OFF
ON
OFF
ON
OFF
ON
OFF
ON
CALL MONITORED BY:
JONES / BESTOR
SCRIBE:
FINCH / BOLDA

#1

F

JANEL

*2

M

#3

M

ROSS

#4

M/F

1

Hello

2

Hi, Janel.

1

Yeah.

DAN LEMASTER

I* Roe* there?

Hold on.

(Background #1 to 3) R O M .

(Background TV noiae)
3

Hello

2

Hey man.

3

Hey what'a up Dan?

2

Hello guy, how ya doin?

3

Not bad at all?

2

So'd ya have fun the other night?

3

Huh?

2

Did ya have fun the other night?

3

Urn you know it.

2

(Laugh)

3

Yeah, it vae really fun.

Yeah, it vae kinda fun, huh?

2

Yeah you really kicked my ass.

Like a wrestlin.

3

We'd wrestled.

2

(Laugh)

3

I got luck.

2

You got lucky my ass.

3

(Laugh)

2

You just threw the moves man, I didn't know moves.
(Inaudible) (Laugh)

3

(Laugh)

2

Your fingers weren't gettin tired, my were.

3

Yeah, I've been working my guitar fingers.

2

That, that's right, you've been practicin your guitar more
lately than I have. (Laugh)

3

(Laugh)

2

That's all he contributes to dQin.

3

Oh nothin, Just gettin ready to go down to the gym.

2

Alright man.

3

What's that?

2

I was supposed to go down to the gym Sunday.
day Sunday.

3

All day?

2

All day.

3

Really?

2

I woke up at seven o'clock.

3

At night.

2

Uh-huh. (•)

3

Oh vow.

<Laugh)

(Laugh)

(Laugh)

So what's up man?

God do you know what I did Sunday?

I slept all

2

(Laugh)

3

That, that vat a good party than, huh?

2

Yeah, It vas a good party*
and an <inaudible)

3

Yeah, me neither.

2

Stayed up a couple nighta in a row too late doln other thing,
ya know, to been klnda tired man.

3

Uh-huh (•)

2

And a, and a, vae klnda like worn out I gueaa.
needed aome aleep. (Laugh)

3

Yeah.

2

Heh, the reaaon I called you bud I'm tryln to find Vlllan.

3

The Vlllan.

2

The Vlllan

3

What'd ya need?

2

Aaa, you know that?

3

Some white?

2

Yeah.

3

Aaaa he really don't have an addreaa.

2

That'a klnda what (inaudible) Blake Juet aald. I juet, I
didn't talked to Blake. I talked to hla old lady though.

3

Yeah.

2

Um

3

He klnda like don't have a addreaa, but he'a around
aomewhere.

2

Any idea where?

3

I have no idea.

2

Mo idea. You, you can, can you help me out (inaudible) by
any chance?

I havan't partiad In a long time

Ya know

3

Wall I probably could, but I it probably vould be from
Villan.

2

Oh, OK, ao eome, somebody else though.

3

Yeah.

2

I need like a, a, a little half.

3

A vhat a email one?

2

Yeah, a little half.

3

Yeah.

2

Like you did that night.

3

Yeah.

2

OK, urn like how, hov aoon?

3

I don't knov.

2

I'm at vork.

3

Will vould I be going to your vork or aomethin?

2

Urn, veil I vaa just gonna cruiae over and pick it up if I
could find Villan, if I could find him juet cruiae over
pick 'em up.

3

Yeah, if you could find Villan you vouldn't even need me.

2

Yeah, right.

3

Huh

2

Do you knov vhere aomethin, ya knov aomethin'a happen.

3

Z knov vhere aomethin'a happen but.

2

I could juet meet ya aomeplace in a half hour or aomethin.

3

I knov but I vaa auppoaed to go to lunch right nov.

2

Oh, really?

3

Uh-huh <•)

2

After lunch?

3

Yeah.

(Inaudible)

Probably, vhy, vhere you at vork?
Yeah.

But ya knov.

2

What tiaa you goin to lunch?
alavan?

You goin to lunch right now,

3

Yeah, right now, eleven.

2

And then where can I meet you at what time?

3

Probably about twelve thirty.

2

Twelve

3

la that cool?

2

Where at?

3

Aaa at ay ahop.

2

OK

3

OK

2

I'll aee ya, how bout, how bout one then?

3

Alright, it be cooler.

2

OK cuz Joan'a gonna pick ae up at one.

3

That'd be better.

2

Get eomme ahocka on ay truck, atuff like that. So I'll
drop her off, then I'll be around one, one-thirty,
eomethin like that.

3

OK

2

K bud.

3

K.

Coae alone.

2

K.

Thank you.

3

Bye

2

(Pause) Bye

Twelve.

TRANSCRIBED CONVERSATION
CALL #639
COUNTER
PG 1 OF 2 PAGES
SUBJECT NAME —
TARGET PHONE -CASE NUMBER
—
DATE
NUMBER DIALED
TIME OFF HOOK
TIME ON HOOK
INCOMING
ANSWERED?
NUMBER OF RINGS
PHONE BUSY?
#1 F JANEL

251 - 282
ROSS GALLEGOS
801-373-2703
8900643
04-03-89
134708
134828
YES
2
NO

ROSS

MINIMIZATION TIMES:
OFF
ON
OFF
ON
OFF
ON
OFF
ON
OFF
ON
OFF
ON
CALL MONITORED BY:
MEYER / MORALES
SCRIBE:
K MORALES
#2

M

DAN

#4

M/F

43

M

1

Hello

2

Hi Janel, is Rose there?

1

Yeah*

3

Hello.

2

Hey dude.

3

Hey, what'a up Dan?

2

Mlseed you man.

3

Oh yeah.

2

Went down to the gym and you weren't there.

3

Oh.

2

Shall I come to your houee?

3

Huh?

2

Shall I come to your houee?

3

Well, yeah, but I don't think I'm gonna be able to get it.

2

Okay dokay man.

Hold on.

It'e Dan.

(To backtround)

I know.

3

Oh, tha raaaon vhy la bacauaa thay'ra, I guaas, thay'ra
watching urn naxt door to our shop.

2

Oh'a that right?

3

Yaah, va vant In to confirm It and thay didn't avan tall us
duda, and wm'rm bummad. Soaaona alaa told ua that thay...

2

That right?

3

Yaah, and thay thay vaa Ilka frlanda of Jaffa and va vant In
thara and thay didn't tall ua.

2

No kiddin.

3

Yaah, so lika, fucking punka and than and than my bud Wool
goaa dovn to tha shop and aaya aoma lady'a ataring at him
from out of thara. And I go no shit and ha goaa yaah, and I
go fuck.

2

That's yaah, yaah, cafa acroaa tha straat.

3

No, tha VCR placa, yaah tha cafa across tha straat la vhara
va vant.

2

Huh.

3

No shit.

2

Oh vail man

3

So I battar not ba making no movaa yaah (indiacarnabla)

2

No vay man, no vay Joaa, um that's vhy thay ^9rm looking at
ma vhan I vas dovn thara. (Laugh)

3

Yaah.

2

I can dig it.

3

K bud.

2

All right.

3

Bya

2

Bya

What a fuckin daal man.

(Laugh)
All right duda.

Saa ya.

TRANSCRIBED CONVERSATION
CALL #1339
COUNTER
PG 1 OF 4 PAGES
SUBJECT NAME —
TARGET PHONE —
CASE NUMBER —
DATE
NUMBER DIALED
TIME OFF HOOK
TIME ON HOOK
INCOMING
ANSWERED?
NUMBER OF RINGS
PHONE BUSY?
#1

M

160 - 211
ROSS GALLEGOS
801-373-2703
8900643
04-14-69
100521
100731
YES
1
NO

ROSS GALLEGOS

#3 M/F

MINIMIZATION TIMES:
OFF
ON
OFF
ON
OFF
ON
OFF
ON
OFF
ON
OFF
ON
CALL MONITORED BY:
FINCH / NIELSEN
SCRIBE)
NIELSEN
#2

M

#4

M/F

DAN LEMASTER

1

Hello?

2

Hey men

1

Hey, the phone fell and hung up on ya.

2

Yeah, that's all right.

1

Yeah.

2

Ya had a good time laat the other night before laat,
huh?

1

Yeah. Buddy of mine knocked on ay door about 10 in the
morning 'n voke me up.

2

No kiddin?

1

We did.

2

Yeah, I knov.

1

Fun ones. That's what we'll call em.
until like 8 in the morning.

2

No kidding?

1

Yeah.

Are you awake today?

We did fun ones

2

That'a a (inaudible)

1

Did ya?

2

Huh?

1

Yaah, that's what happened.

2

That sounds like real fun buddy.

1

Yeah and then I vent and then I slept.

2

(Laugh)

1

And vent to work.

2

Oh, no.

1

Yeah.

2

Oh that's like, like a, like normal people.

1

Like normal people, huh?

2

Get up and go to vork and (inaudible).
hov to do this. You party all night.

1

(Laugh)

2

(Inaudible) go to vork now.

1

Yeah, it sucks.

2

(Inaudible) your vife last night too.
vith ya man. (Laugh)

1

Where you, at vork?

2

I'm at work, yeah.

1

Where's the channel changer?

2

Huh?

1

I's lookln for the channel changer.

2

Oh.

1

Huh?

2

Do you know where we can a get some real quick?

For like goin on 4.

You goin straigh (inaudible) vent to vork.

Ya knov.

You're figuring out

Cuz she's right there

Hey bud, you know where a (inaudible)

1

Yeah, I p r o b a b l y d o .

2

Yeah.

1

But I'm not really to Into goin to get it cuz I don't vanna
get none.

2

I'll I'll coin* over and get ya in a little bit.

1

Huh?

2

I'll coma over and gat ya if you like.

1

What?

2

I'll coma ovtr and gat you in a little vhile later.

1

Oh no, that's alright I'll go by myself.

2

Really?

1

Yeah, I can probably do ya a gamer.

2

Really?

1

Yeah.

2

(Inaudible)

1

Huh?

2

(Inaudible)

1

What?

2

(Inaudible)

1

Hov much?

2

After lunch.

1

God, let me turn this fuckln TV dovn.

2

After lunch?

1

Yeah.

2

(Inaudible) lemme talk.

1

What time's that "after lunch"?

2

Urn.

Like a, a game?

You could (inaudible)

I take lunch at like noon.

What?

1

OK.

I gotta run thia tap*, this porno back up to my bud.

2

Really?

1

Yeah, up in A. P.

2

OK.

1

Noonlsh sounds cool.

2

Raally?

1

Yaah.

2

Noon 30?

1

Noon 30.

2

OK.

1

OK bud

2

OK bud

1

Bya

2

Saa ya, thank you.

1

Bya

Say like a aayba lika...

So I coma ovtr ba about noon?

I gotta go pick up soma you knov aonay (inaudibla)

TRANSCRIBED CONVERSATION
CALL #1502
COUNTER
PC 1 OF 2 PAGES
SUBJECT NAME —
TARGET PHONE -CASE NUMBER -DATE
NUMBER DIALED
TIME OFF HOOK
TIME ON HOOK
INCOMING
ANSWERED?
NUMBER OF RINGS
PHONE BUSY?

294 - 327
ROSS GALLEGOS
801-373-2703
8900643
04-15-89
375-5568
172914
173038
YES
1
NO

MINIMIZATION TIMES»
OFF
ON
OFF
ON
OFF
ON
OFF
ON
OFF
ON
OFF
ON
CALL MONITORED BY:
WEST / PARKER
SCRIBE:
PARKER

#1

H/F

CHILD

#2

#3

H

ROSS Ci LLEGOS

#4 M/F

1

Hello

2

Hi, is Ross home?

1

Who's this?

2

Sergio.

1

Who?

2

Sergio.

1

He's (inaudible) it's yours.

2

OK

3

Hello

2

Hello, Ross?

3

Yeah

2

Hov are you?

3

Hello, vhat's up Serg?

2

Not too such*

3

Not bad.

<Cough)

Sergio.

Hov you been?

SERGIO

H
i

K hold on.

2

Hey, I

3

Yeah

2

I needed to talk to you.

3

About what?

2

A, get some.

3

Some white?

2

A, a green paper.

3

Oh really?

2

Yeah.

3

Hmm, urn, veil, you knov where I live don't ya?

2

No man.

3

Up around, University er Carterville Road.

2

Carterville Road?

3

Yeah.

2

In the same place?

3

Uh-huh <•>

2

OK, I'll be there and talk to you.

3

K

2

OK

3

Bye

2

Bye

APPENDIX C

INSTRUCTION NO.

The essential elements

//

of the crime charged in count

II of the Information are as follows:
1. That the defendant, Ross Gallegos, did distribute,
agree, consent, offer or arrange to distribute Marijuana, a
controlled substance.
2.

That

the

defendant

did

so

intentionally

and

knowingly.
3. That the acts of the defendant occurred in Utah
County, State of Utah, on or about March 23, 1989.
If you believe the evidence establishes each and all of
the essential elements of the offense as above-stated beyond a
reasonable doubt, it is your duty to convict the defendant.

On

the other hand, if the evidence has failed to establish one or
more of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then it is
your duty to find the defendant not guilty

